A legal practitioner and House of Representatives candidate in the 2027 general elections, Barrister El-Shadai Ikeh, has dragged the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and its Chairman, Professor Joash Ojo Amupitan, SAN, before the Federal High Court in Lagos, challenging the proposed use of artificial intelligence to verify, audit and review election results.
Ikeh is asking the court to declare that artificial intelligence and automated statistical systems have no lawful role in verifying, confirming, determining, collating or re-collating election results under the Electoral Act, 2026.
He is also seeking orders restraining INEC from withholding, delaying or deferring the transmission, publication, collation or declaration of election results, or the issuance of certificates of return, because of anomalies identified by artificial intelligence.
The plaintiff, who is the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC) candidate for the Nkanu East/Nkanu West Federal Constituency of Enugu State, instituted the action against INEC and its Chairman, who was sued in his official capacity.
The suit, marked FHC/LAG/PREM/34/2026, was filed on October 26, 2026, at the Lagos Judicial Division of the Federal High Court by Originating Summons as a pre-election matter under Section 285(14)(b) of the 1999 Constitution.
The accompanying motion is marked FHC/LAG/PREM/34M1/2026.
The plaintiff is represented by Steve Austin Nwabueze, Ogbe Chukwunonso Daniel, Jobson Ekene Nwafor and Michael Onyishi of Kempes & Kaplan LP, incorporating Pelican Forte Juris LP.
In the court documents, Ikeh is challenging announcements made by INEC on October 6 and 14, 2026, concerning the proposed integration of artificial intelligence into the commission’s election results management processes.
According to his supporting affidavit, Professor Amupitan announced at a press conference on October 6 that INEC had established an Artificial Intelligence Division within its Information and Communication Technology Department and intended to deploy AI to verify election results.
The plaintiff contended that the announcement did not explain the specific functions of the proposed system, the information it would examine or how its findings would influence the statutory processes for handling election results.
He further referred to the INEC Chairman’s keynote address at the Artificial Intelligence and Democracy Forum 2026, held in Abuja between October 14 and 16 and jointly convened by INEC and Yiaga Africa.
In the address delivered on October 14, Amupitan explained that human collation would remain the statutory standard for declaring election results but that artificial intelligence could conduct parallel statistical audits of polling-unit result sheets uploaded through the electronic Form EC8A system.
According to the court papers, the proposed technology would identify mathematical inconsistencies, unusual entry patterns and image-quality defects for administrative review.
The plaintiff also cited the Chairman’s reference to automated result audit assistance as one of the applications INEC intended to pursue.
However, the court documents acknowledged that Amupitan had announced the commission’s adoption of a Human Oversight Principle, under which no critical electoral decision, including result collation, would be fully automated or delegated to an autonomous system.
The Chairman had maintained that human accountability, statutory oversight and judicial review would remain paramount.
INEC also disclosed that its AI Governance Framework was still being finalised.
Ikeh argued that although the commission had publicly announced its intention to introduce artificial intelligence into election results management, it had not published the framework governing the technology.
He identified several matters that, according to him, remained undisclosed, including the technical specifications of the results-audit system, the thresholds for identifying anomalies, validation results, error rates and the procedures officials would follow when an election result was flagged.
He also questioned who would exercise final authority over a result identified by the proposed system as requiring administrative review.
The plaintiff maintained that the Regulations and Guidelines for the Conduct of Elections, 2026, signed by Amupitan on April 30, contained no provision expressly authorising artificial intelligence, algorithms, automated statistical audits or administrative reviews of polling-unit results.
He argued that the commission could not introduce an additional stage into the statutory election results process through a public announcement or an unpublished internal framework.
Ikeh further stated that neither he nor his political party had been consulted about the proposed technology.
He disclosed that the NDC National Legal Adviser informed him during a virtual strategy meeting on October 23 that the party had not been consulted.
According to the plaintiff, INEC’s approach was inconsistent with its established practice of consulting political parties and stakeholders before introducing major electoral procedures.
He referred to the preface of the commission’s 2026 Regulations and Guidelines, which stated that extensive consultations had been conducted with political parties.
He also cited INEC’s presentation of draft Regulations and Guidelines for Political Parties to party leaders on March 24, 2026, and its public explanation of electronic transmission and collation procedures before the 2023 general elections.
In the Originating Summons, Ikeh formulated eight questions for determination by the court.
He wants the court to determine whether Sections 62(4), 62(6) and 62(7) of the Electoral Act, 2026, permit collation or returning officers to rely on artificial intelligence or automated statistical outputs when verifying, confirming, determining disputed results or conducting re-collation.
He also asked whether INEC’s decision to subject polling-unit results uploaded through the electronic Form EC8A system to automated audits and refer flagged results for administrative review introduces an additional procedure not contemplated by Sections 60 and 62 of the Act.
The plaintiff further wants the court to determine whether Section 50(2), which governs procedures for transmitting election results subject to Section 60, authorises the proposed automated review.
Another question concerns whether INEC can introduce automated audits or administrative reviews without first issuing and publishing appropriate regulations, guidelines or manuals under Section 151 of the Electoral Act.
Ikeh also challenged the possible interpretation of Clause 40(i) of the 2026 Regulations, which refers to “any other Commission-approved verification mechanisms”, and the Collation Support and Result Verification System (CSRVS).
He wants the court to determine whether those provisions can accommodate an artificial intelligence system whose specifications, operating thresholds and outputs have not been published.
The plaintiff also asked whether an anomaly or flag generated by artificial intelligence can lawfully constitute grounds for reviewing an election result under Section 65 of the Electoral Act.
He argued that the provision limits INEC’s review powers to declarations or returns made under duress or knowingly and wilfully contrary to the procedures prescribed under Sections 62(4) to 62(8).
He further challenged Clause 102 of the Regulations, which permits INEC to withhold publication of results and certificates of return following reports that declarations were made contrary to applicable laws, regulations and guidelines.
According to him, the clause is inconsistent with Section 65 to the extent that it permits broader grounds for withholding results or certificates of return.
The plaintiff also wants the court to determine whether INEC may delay or withhold the transmission of polling-unit results to the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV), their collation or their entry in the National Electronic Register of Election Results because of an artificial intelligence flag.
His final question concerns whether he is entitled to disclosure of the commission’s AI Governance Framework and the technical details of any system that will process election results in his constituency before the technology is deployed.
Based on the eight questions, Ikeh is seeking 10 substantive reliefs.
Among them is a declaration that no output generated by artificial intelligence or an automated statistical system constitutes a lawful input into the verification, confirmation, determination, collation or re-collation of election results.
He also seeks a declaration that polling-unit results recorded in Form EC8A and transmitted under Section 60 cannot be subjected to automated screening or administrative review as a condition for transmission to IReV, collation or entry in the National Electronic Register of Election Results.
The plaintiff wants the court to declare that an AI-generated flag cannot, by itself, render a result disputed under Section 62(6) or provide lawful grounds for a review under Section 65.
He further seeks a declaration that Clause 40(i) and the CSRVS cannot be interpreted as authorising an automated or AI-based verification system unless its specifications and operating procedures are issued under Section 151 and published before the elections.
Ikeh is also asking the court to declare that Clause 102 must be interpreted subject to Section 65 and that no result or certificate of return may be withheld except on the statutory grounds relating to duress or knowing and wilful violations of prescribed collation procedures.
He wants the court to declare the clause void to the extent of any inconsistency with the Electoral Act.
In addition, the plaintiff seeks an order of perpetual injunction restraining INEC and its Chairman from withholding, delaying or deferring the transmission, publication, collation or registration of polling-unit results, or the issuance of certificates of return, because of an AI-generated flag.
He is also asking the court to restrain Amupitan from convening an Executive Session, establishing an Election Review Committee or taking action under Clauses 102 to 111 of the Regulations based wholly or partly on an artificial intelligence flag.
The plaintiff further seeks an order directing INEC to publish its AI Governance Framework within 14 days of judgment and, in any event, before the 2027 general elections.
He wants the publication to include the purpose, inputs, outputs, categories of flags, operating thresholds, validation results and error rates of every artificial intelligence system intended to receive or process polling-unit results.
He also wants INEC to publish written rules specifying what electoral officials may do when the system identifies an anomaly.
Another relief seeks an order directing the commission to maintain an immutable, time-stamped record of every automated flag generated during the elections.
The plaintiff wants such records preserved as part of the official election documents and disclosed to him or his agents at the relevant collation centres whenever they concern polling units or collation levels within his constituency.
He is asking that the disclosures be made at the same time and on the same terms as those available to INEC officials.
Alternatively, if the court declines the disclosure-related reliefs, Ikeh seeks a perpetual injunction restraining INEC from deploying artificial intelligence or automated systems in receiving, auditing, verifying or collating polling-unit results during the 2027 general elections.
In his affidavit sworn on October 23, the plaintiff described himself as a legal practitioner of more than 14 years’ standing, enrolled at the Supreme Court of Nigeria, and an indigene of Obe Town in Nkanu West Local Government Area of Enugu State.
He stated that he instituted the action in his personal capacity as a candidate and not on behalf of the NDC or any other political party.
Ikeh expressed concern that applying automated statistical audits to results from the country’s 176,846 polling units could generate numerous flags, depending on the system’s error rate.
He argued that without access to the operating rules and records of such flags, candidates would be unable to determine why particular results were questioned or whether automated assessments influenced their transmission, collation or declaration.
According to him, this could place candidates at a disadvantage when challenging election outcomes before election tribunals, where they would bear the burden of proving their allegations.
However, he expressly stated that his action was not intended to stop the elections.
“I do not seek to stop, suspend or postpone any election,” Ikeh stated in his affidavit.
He maintained that his objective was to obtain judicial clarification of the statutory and regulatory framework governing INEC’s proposed integration of artificial intelligence into election results management.
The plaintiff attached 11 documentary exhibits, marked EI-1 to EI-11, to support his claims.
The exhibits include INEC’s final list of House of Representatives candidates, its revised election timetable dated February 26, 2026, and the 2026 Regulations and Guidelines.
They also include media reports on INEC’s October 6 announcement, the commission’s October 14 Wednesday Bulletin, its official social media publication and reports of the Artificial Intelligence and Democracy Forum.
Other exhibits include reports on the forum’s outcome document, a September 10, 2026, publication by TheNigeriaLawyer concerning Amupitan’s presentation at the Global Conference on Responsible AI and Elections in Ottawa, Canada, and reports concerning INEC’s previous consultations with political parties.
The plaintiff also exhibited INEC’s February 2023 explanation of electronic transmission and collation procedures.
He stated that the electronic documents were printed from official sources using his laptop and printer, and made a supporting declaration under Section 84(4) of the Evidence Act, 2011.
In their written address, the plaintiff’s lawyers argued that the Electoral Act, 2026, expressly prescribes how polling-unit results must be recorded, transmitted, verified, collated, disputed and reviewed.
They maintained that artificial intelligence has no place in that statutory framework unless the National Assembly expressly provides for it.
Counsel submitted that INEC “cannot give it one by announcement, by an unpublished framework, or through open-ended clauses in their own Regulations and Guidelines.”
The lawyers argued that Sections 60 and 62 establish a complete procedure for handling election results, leaving no room for an additional automated screening stage between transmission and collation.
They maintained that the lawful sources available to collation officers include signed Form EC8A results, accreditation devices and data transmitted directly from polling units.
According to them, the Act already identifies the circumstances in which results may be verified, disputed, re-collated or reviewed.
They contended that a statistical anomaly identified by an algorithm does not necessarily establish that an election result is incorrect.
“An algorithm’s judgment that a result is statistically ‘atypical’ is not evidence that it is incorrect. A genuine landslide, a high turnout in a candidate’s home ward, or an upset in a historically safe area will each look atypical to a model trained on the past,” the lawyers argued.
They maintained that the proposed administrative review would introduce a stage not contemplated by the Electoral Act.
Counsel further argued that Section 50(2) concerns voting and transmission procedures, while Section 47(2) authorises technological devices for voter accreditation rather than automated verification or collation of election results.
They relied on judicial authorities, including Awolowo v. Shagari, Ojokolobo v. Alamu, CCB (Nig.) Plc v. A-G Anambra State, Ehuwa v. Ondo State INEC and Dangana v. Usman, to support their position that where legislation prescribes a procedure, alternative methods cannot be introduced administratively.
They also cited Wike v. Peterside, Oyetola v. INEC, Atiku v. INEC and Lawal v. Matawalle on the relationship between statutory election procedures and supporting technologies.
The lawyers argued that the card reader and IReV decisions demonstrated that technological innovations could support statutory processes but could not replace or alter them.
They further maintained that Section 65 of the Electoral Act, 2026, narrowed the commission’s powers to review declarations compared with the corresponding provision in the repealed Electoral Act, 2022.
According to counsel, an automated flag is not a report from an electoral official, while a statistical anomaly does not, without more, establish duress or a knowing and wilful breach of collation procedures.
They also challenged INEC’s reliance on its regulations, arguing that Section 151 permits the commission to issue regulations only for the purpose of implementing the Electoral Act and not to introduce procedures inconsistent with it.
Counsel cited INEC v. Musa and Wike v. Peterside in support of the argument that administrative regulations cannot override statutory provisions.
They submitted that Clause 40(i) concerns verification at polling units before transmission and cannot authorise an unpublished system for screening results at INEC headquarters.
They also argued that Clause 102, when read together with Clause 40(i), could create a route through which an automated flag might ultimately lead to the withholding of a certificate of return.
On disclosure, counsel relied on Sections 62(2) and 62(3) of the Electoral Act and Section 2(3) of the Freedom of Information Act, 2011.
They maintained that election results are public records and that candidates should be entitled to information concerning automated processes capable of influencing their results.
The lawyers also referred to INEC’s publicly announced Human Oversight Principle, under which artificial intelligence systems are expected to be explainable, fair, secure and subject to human accountability.
According to them, the requested disclosure orders would merely require INEC to comply with standards it had publicly adopted.
“Reliefs 8 and 9 do no more than hold the Defendants to the principle they have publicly adopted,” counsel submitted.
They further argued that undisclosed automated decisions could make it practically impossible for candidates to establish the effect of such systems on election results during subsequent litigation.
Counsel cited Section 138(2) of the Electoral Act and Section 168(1) of the Evidence Act in support of their concerns.
They acknowledged that the Electoral Act does not impose a general statutory obligation on INEC to consult individual candidates.
However, they argued that the commission’s established practice of consulting political parties and stakeholders created a legitimate expectation of consultation.
They relied on Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service and R v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan as persuasive authorities.
The lawyers also maintained that Amupitan was properly joined as a defendant because he announced the proposed policy and exercises responsibilities under the regulations concerning election reviews.
They insisted that the action did not challenge the conduct of the elections themselves, the use of technology for electoral logistics or cybersecurity, or any lawful procedure under Sections 60 and 62.
Alongside the Originating Summons, Ikeh filed a Motion on Notice dated October 26, 2026, seeking accelerated hearing and interim protection pending determination of the substantive suit.
The motion was brought under Section 13(1) of the Federal High Court Act, Orders 26, 28 and 46 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2019, the Federal High Court (Pre-Election) Practice Directions, 2026, as amended, and the court’s inherent jurisdiction.
He asked the court to reduce the time allowed for INEC and its Chairman to enter an appearance and file their counter-affidavit and written address to seven days after service.
He also sought an order reducing his own time to file a further affidavit and reply on points of law to three days after receiving the defendants’ processes.
The plaintiff further requested an accelerated hearing of the Originating Summons at the earliest practicable date.
He is also seeking an interlocutory injunction restraining INEC, pending determination of the suit, from making clearance of an AI-generated flag a condition for transmitting, collating, publishing or registering election results, or issuing certificates of return.
The proposed injunction would apply to the 2027 National Assembly elections nationwide, including the Senate and House of Representatives elections in his constituency.
He also asked the court to restrain the INEC Chairman from convening an Executive Session, establishing an Election Review Committee or acting on an AI-generated flag as grounds for reviewing election results without independently identified evidence satisfying Section 65 of the Electoral Act.
Alternatively, the plaintiff asked the court to restrict the protective orders to election results, declarations and certificates of return relating to the Nkanu East/Nkanu West Federal Constituency.
Explaining the urgency of the application, Ikeh stated that the presidential and National Assembly elections were scheduled for January 16, 2027, less than three months after the filing of the suit.
He argued that a judgment delivered after the election would be of little practical value in resolving the dispute before the proposed technology was used.
The plaintiff also noted that ordinary court procedures could allow the defendants up to 30 days to respond, potentially delaying the hearing until at least mid-December 2026.
He referred to Section 285(10) of the Constitution, which requires pre-election matters to be determined within 180 days of filing.
According to him, an accelerated hearing would minimise the duration and operational effect of any protective order.
His lawyers emphasised that the motion was not seeking an indefinite restraint against INEC or an order stopping the elections.
They also acknowledged that the commission might argue that its proposed artificial intelligence system would operate only as a parallel audit under human supervision.
Counsel stated that if the actual operating rules confirmed that position, it could materially affect the merits of the case and the need for an injunction.
They expressly acknowledged that the plaintiff had not established any completed alteration of a 2027 election result, any demonstrated false-positive rate or any undisclosed imminent deployment date.
The lawyers explained that the requested injunction would not prevent INEC from conducting internal testing or operating a published, non-binding audit system that did not make automated clearance a condition for processing election results.
They also clarified that the proposed order would not prevent electoral officials from acting on independently established statutory grounds for review merely because an automated alert initially drew attention to an issue.
Counsel relied on Obeya Memorial Specialist Hospital v. A-G Federation, Kotoye v. CBN, INEC v. Musa, Wike v. Peterside and Musa & Ors v. Orume & Ors in support of their application.
They maintained that the requested orders would respect Section 88(4) of the Electoral Act, 2026, which prohibits courts from stopping the conduct of primaries or general elections.
In his supporting affidavit, Ikeh acknowledged that he had no document establishing the precise date on which INEC intended to deploy the proposed results-audit system.
He also admitted that no polling-unit result from the 2027 elections had yet been withheld or altered because of an AI-generated flag.
The plaintiff undertook to comply with any order for damages if the requested injunction was subsequently found to have been wrongly granted.
Meanwhile, INEC has publicly maintained that artificial intelligence would support electoral officials rather than replace human decision-making.
At the Artificial Intelligence and Democracy Forum, Amupitan stated that algorithms “will not and must never decide” the 2027 vote.
He also maintained that the responsibility for choosing Nigeria’s leaders “belongs exclusively to the Nigerian people”.
At the Global Conference on Responsible AI and Elections in Ottawa, Canada, the INEC Chairman similarly explained that artificial intelligence “will remain a support tool and will not replace human decision-making”.
He disclosed that an existing technological tool could digitise Form EC8A results and identify discrepancies with Bimodal Voter Accreditation System records for review by electoral officials.
According to him, such a system “does not alter results”.
The INEC Chairman also indicated that certain operational details could not be publicly disclosed because of cybersecurity concerns.
He stated that the commission was developing a five-pillar AI Governance Framework to regulate the responsible deployment of artificial intelligence in electoral administration.
However, Ikeh maintained that the absence of a published framework, clearly defined operating rules and disclosure procedures created uncertainty over the proposed technology’s legal status and potential consequences for candidates.
The suit remains pending before the Federal High Court in Lagos.
As of the filing of the court documents, no hearing date had been communicated, and there was no indication that INEC or its Chairman had filed a response to the action.
The court has not determined the legality of INEC’s proposed use of artificial intelligence in election results management or granted any of the injunctions sought by the plaintiff.
Post Title: “AI Has No Lawful Role In Collating Election Results” — NDC Candidate Sues INEC, Amupitan, Seeks Injunction Against Automated Review In 2027 By Naijaonpoint.